

1 **BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION**

2 COMMISSIONERS

3 MARC SPITZER, Chairman
4 WILLIAM A. MUNDELL
5 JEFF HATCH-MILLER
6 MIKE GLEASON
KRISTIN K. MAYES

7 In the matter of)

) DOCKET NO. S-03532A-03-0000

8 ***CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON LLC,***)

9 ***f/k/a CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON***)

10 ***CORPORATION***)

) DECISION NO. 66647

11 ***11 Madison Avenue***)

12 ***New York, New York 10010***)

13 ***CRD# 816***)

) **ORDER TO CEASE AND DESIST, ORDER**
) **FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PENALTIES AND**
) **CONSENT TO SAME**
) **BY: CREDIT SUISSE FIRST BOSTON LLC**

14 Respondents.)

15 WHEREAS, Credit Suisse First Boston LLC, f/k/a Credit Suisse First Boston Corporation
16 (“CSFB”), is a broker-dealer registered in the state of Arizona; and

17 WHEREAS, coordinated investigations into CSFB’s activities in connection with certain of its
18 equity research and IPO stock allocation practices during the period of 1998 through 2001 have
19 been conducted by a multi-state task force and a joint task force of the U.S. Securities and
20 Exchange Commission, the New York Stock Exchange, and the National Association of Securities
21 Dealers (collectively, the “regulators”); and

22 WHEREAS, CSFB has advised regulators of its agreement to resolve the investigations relating
23 to its research and stock allocation practices; and

24 WHEREAS, CSFB agrees to implement certain changes with respect to its research and stock
25 allocation practices, and to make certain payments; and

26 NOW, THEREFORE, the Arizona Corporation Commission (“Commission”) hereby enters
this Order:

1 CSFB elects to permanently waive any right to a hearing and appeal under Articles 11 and 12
2 of the Securities Act of Arizona, A.R.S. §44-1801 *et seq.* (“Securities Act”) and Title 14 of the
3 Arizona Administrative Code with respect to this Order To Cease and Desist and Order for
4 Administrative Penalties (“Order”); neither admits nor denies the Findings of Fact and Conclusions
5 of Law contained in this Order, and consents to the entry of this Order by the Commission.

6 I.

7 FINDINGS OF FACT

8 1. Summary

9 From July 1998 through December 2001 (the “relevant period”), CSFB used its equity research
10 analysts to help solicit and conduct investment banking business. By providing incentives for
11 equity research analysts to assist in the generation of investment banking revenues, CSFB created
12 and fostered an environment with conflicts of interest that, in some circumstances, undermined the
13 independence of research analysts and affected the objectivity of the reports they issued.

14 The conflicts of interest and pressure on equity research analysts to contribute to investment
15 banking revenue were particularly present in CSFB’s Technology Group, headed by Frank
16 Quattrone, where research analysts’ supervision and compensation were closely aligned with
17 investment banking. CSFB’s investment banking revenue, driven mostly by technology stocks,
18 steadily and significantly increased, from \$1.79 billion in 1998, to \$2.32 billion in 1999, and to
19 \$3.68 billion in 2000. The sphere of influence and authority that Quattrone exercised at CSFB
20 remained significant throughout the technology boom.

21 CSFB’s efforts to attract potential and continued investment banking business created pressure
22 on equity research analysts to initiate and maintain favorable coverage on investment banking
23 clients. This pressure at times undermined equity research analyst objectivity and independence.
24 CSFB’s marketing, or “pitch,” materials in some instances implicitly promised that a company
25 would receive favorable research if it agreed to use CSFB for its investment banking business. In
26 addition, companies, in some instances pressured analysts to continue coverage or maintain a

1 certain rating or else risk losing the company as an investment-banking client. In certain instances,
2 these factors compromised the independence of equity research analysts and impaired the
3 objectivity of research reports.

4 The independence of some of CSFB's equity research analysts was also impaired by the fact
5 that they were evaluated, in part, by investment banking professionals and that their compensation
6 was influenced by their contribution to investment banking revenues. Indeed, the vast majority of
7 their overall compensation, in the form of bonuses, was based on the investment banking revenues
8 generated by the firm. In many instances, bonuses for non-technology equity research analysts'
9 were directly linked to revenue generated by the firm on specific investment banking transactions.
10 The fact that an equity research analyst's bonus was in part related to revenue from investment
11 banking business created pressure on analysts to help generate more investment banking revenue.

12 The undue and improper influence imposed by CSFB's investment bankers on the firm's
13 technology research analysts caused CSFB to issue fraudulent research reports on two companies:
14 Digital Impact, Inc. ("Digital Impact") and Synopsys, Inc. ("Synopsys"). The reports were
15 fraudulent in that they expressed positive views of the companies' stocks that were contrary to the
16 analysts' true, privately held beliefs. In these instances, investment bankers pressured research
17 analysts to initiate or maintain positive research coverage to obtain or retain investment banking
18 business, and the analysts were pressured or compelled to compromise their own professional
19 opinions regarding the companies at the direction of the firm's investment bankers. In addition, as
20 to Numerical Technologies, Inc. ("Numerical Technologies"), Agilent Technologies, Inc.
21 ("Agilent"), and Winstar Communications, Inc. ("Winstar") - the pressure on analysts resulted in
22 the issuance of research reports that lacked a reasonable basis, failed to provide a balanced
23 presentation of the relevant facts, made exaggerated or unwarranted claims, or failed to disclose
24 material facts; as to NewPower Holdings, Inc. ("NPW"), CSFB issued research reports which, at
25 times, failed to disclose that CSFB and the research analysts covering NPW had proprietary
26 interests in NPW. CSFB also engaged in improper IPO "spinning" activities. From 1999 until

1 April 2001, CSFB, through its Technology Private Client Services Group, a department within the
2 Technology Group, allocated shares in CSFB's lead-managed technology IPOs to executive
3 officers of its investment banking clients who were in a position to provide investment banking
4 business to CSFB. This group engaged in such spinning with the belief and expectation that the
5 executives would steer investment banking business for their companies to CSFB. CSFB opened
6 discretionary trading accounts on behalf of these executives. Since most of the IPOs offered by
7 CSFB were "hot" (i.e., they began trading in the aftermarket at a premium), and since portions of
8 the allocations were typically "flipped" out (i.e., sold almost immediately) once the aftermarket
9 opened, the spinning produced large, instantaneous profits for those executives who participated in
10 these arrangements. By having CSFB brokers control trading in these accounts, the executives
11 who owned some of these accounts were able to realize profits in excess of \$1 million through this
12 IPO activity.

13 **2. CSFB's Structure and Procedures Created Conflicts of Interest for Equity Research**
14 **Analysts and, in Certain Circumstances, Undermined Their Independence and**
15 **Affected the Objectivity of Their Reports**

16 **a. Overview of CSFB**

17 CSFB LLC ("CSFB"), or a predecessor firm thereof, has been an NASD member
18 since 1936. CSFB, headquartered in New York, is part of the Credit Suisse First Boston
19 business unit, a global investment bank whose businesses include securities underwriting,
20 sales and trading, investment banking, private equity, financial advisory services, investment
21 research, and asset management. The Credit Suisse First Boston business unit is a subsidiary
22 of Credit Suisse Group, which is headquartered in Switzerland. On November 3, 2000,
23 Credit Suisse Group acquired Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Securities Corporation ("DLJ"),
24 another NASD member firm. As of December 31, 2002, the Credit Suisse First Boston
25 business unit had approximately 23,400 employees worldwide.
26

1 **b. The Supervisory Structure of CSFB’s Technology Group Created Conflicts of**
2 **Interest for Equity Research Analysts and Lacked Sufficient Supervision of the**
3 **Technology PCS Group**

4 Until June 1998, all of CSFB’s equity research was issued through research analysts
5 who worked in the Equity Research Department and who reported to the Director of Equity
6 Research. Until that time, no equity research analysts were supervised by or had any
7 reporting obligations to anyone in any investment banking department.

8 In June 1998, CSFB recruited Frank Quattrone, who was then in a senior position at
9 Deutsche Bank Securities (also known as Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Inc. or “DMG”) to head
10 a distinct unit the Technology Group at CSFB that would provide an array of services to
11 technology companies. Quattrone became the Managing Director of the CSFB Technology
12 Group’s Investment Banking Division, and negotiated a contract with CSFB to maintain the
13 Technology Group as a semi-autonomous, “firm-within-a-firm” unit within CSFB through
14 December 2001.

15 Quattrone established separate departments within the Technology Group for
16 corporate finance (investment banking), mergers and acquisitions, equity research, and a
17 department devoted to private client services (“PCS”), each of which reported to him. One
18 of the purposes of the PCS department was to provide personal brokerage services to officers
19 of investment banking clients of the Technology Group. The directors of the Technology
20 Group Research Department and PCS Department had dual reporting obligations to
21 Quattrone and to department directors in the firm’s Equities Division, but as a practical
22 matter, the principal reporting line was to Quattrone until a change in procedures instituted in
23 June 2001.

24 CSFB hired individuals who had worked closely with Quattrone at DMG to fill many
25 senior level positions, including each of the department directors, within the Technology
26 Group. Many of the people whom CSFB hired to work in the Technology Group had

1 worked together previously at DMG. In fact, many of the equity research analysts and
2 investment bankers whom CSFB employed from July 1998 through 2001 were recruited or
3 merged into CSFB from other firms. The first infusion of those professionals came in July
4 and August 1998, when the directors and others from DMG formed the Technology Group at
5 CSFB. Given the wholesale move of the personnel, including senior management in research
6 and investment banking, the reporting structure, work ethic, and future expectations of their
7 roles likewise carried over to their new positions at CSFB.

8 As a result of the structure set forth above, Quattrone exercised his authority to apply
9 an overall Technology Group strategy in his supervision of the Group's research analysts.
10 He used that authority for "resource allocation" to influence the determination of those
11 sectors, and in some cases the particular companies on which Technology Group research
12 would initiate or maintain coverage. As a consequence of Quattrone's influence, Technology
13 Group investment bankers were, at times, able to influence the sectors, and in some cases the
14 particular companies, for which CSFB technology research analysts initiated or maintained
15 coverage. At times, this determination was based on the level of CSFB's actual or
16 anticipated investment banking business with a particular company.

17 **c. Investment Banking Revenue Was a Major Source of Revenue and Influence at**
18 **CSFB**

19 From 1998 to 2000, CSFB's income from investment banking rose dramatically,
20 fueled primarily by the technology sector offerings completed under Quattrone's leadership.
21 In 1998, driven in large part from the revenue generated by the newly formed Technology
22 Group, CSFB's investment banking revenue increased from approximately \$1.47 billion to
23 approximately \$1.79 billion or 21 percent. In 1999, the importance of investment banking as
24 a major source of revenue continued to grow, as did its revenue and number of employees.
25 That year, revenue from investment banking grew to approximately \$2.318 billion, a 22
26 percent increase over 1998. Also in 1999, largely through the efforts of the Technology

1 Group, CSFB managed more domestic IPOs than any other investment banking firm. By
2 2000, CSFB's investment banking revenue had mushroomed to approximately \$3.681
3 billion, a full 59 percent increase over the previous year. Investment banking revenue in
4 2000 represented the largest percent increase in revenue for CSFB, constituting its second
5 largest revenue source behind equity trading and sales and accounting for 30 percent of the
6 firm's total revenues.

7 **d. CSFB's Equity Research Analysts' Bonuses Were Determined, in Part, by the**
8 **Degree to Which They Assisted Investment Banking, Thereby Compromising**
9 **Research Independence**

10 *Non-Technology Research*

11 From July 1998 until May 2001, equity research analysts in non-technology sectors at
12 CSFB received bonuses that were directly and indirectly based on the amount of investment
13 banking revenue they helped generate. This created a conflict of interest for research
14 analysts who had an incentive to help win investment banking deals for CSFB while they
15 were also expected to issue objective research regarding those companies.

16 Specifically, equity research analysts were paid up to three percent of the net revenue
17 generated by an investment banking deal, with a maximum bonus of \$250,000 per deal.
18 Some equity research analysts were also guaranteed a minimum bonus of either \$15,000 or
19 \$20,000 for the investment banking deals on which they worked, depending on whether
20 CSFB was lead or co-manager of the deal. This compensation was not part of the annual
21 bonus, but was pursuant to employment contracts, paid on a quarterly basis. This program
22 was initiated to provide an incentive for research analysts to assist in winning investment
23 banking business. According to the Director of Equity Research:

24 the head of equity capital markets and investment banking, felt that they
25 needed some help in '98 in generating additional ... help on investment
26 banking transactions or at least ... having analysts feel that it was somewhat
part of their compensation.

1 The actual amount paid to a research analyst was based on the level of contribution
2 that the research analyst made in connection with investment banking deals, as decided with
3 input from the investment bankers. The conflict was evident in the reviews performed by
4 investment bankers as well as self-reviews prepared by research analysts.

5 In evaluating the performance of equity research analysts to determine their
6 compensation, investment bankers used a form that judged the analyst by origination of the
7 deal, execution of the deal, and follow-through. Each section allowed for handwritten
8 comments and called for the investment banker to rank the research analyst from one to
9 three.

10 In one such evaluation, an investment banker wrote that the research analyst's "input
11 and track record was critical to winning this business.... [The analyst] performed at her
12 normal high level making a lot of investor calls.... [The analyst's] initiation of research
13 coverage was timely and insightful. She has been a supporter of the stock despite difficult
14 Internet environment."

15 *Technology Group Research*

16 From July 1998 until December 2001, equity research analysts employed in the
17 Technology Group were compensated, in part, based on their contribution to investment
18 banking deals. The vast majority of equity research analysts' compensation was derived
19 from the bonus received rather than the base salary. At CSFB, it was not uncommon for a
20 more senior level Technology Group research analyst to have a salary of \$100,000 -
21 \$250,000, and also receive a bonus of \$5,000,000 - \$10,000,000 or higher. The Technology
22 Group bonus pool was funded by fifty percent of technology-related investment banking
23 revenues minus select expenses (including mergers and acquisitions) as well as a percentage
24 of revenue generated by secondary sales and trading in technology stocks, and a percentage
25 of Technology PCS revenues. In determining the allocation for each analyst, the Director of
26 Technology Research stated that he would review revenue generated with respect to each

1 company followed by the analyst, including revenues relating to banking, sales, trading,
2 derivatives, high yield, private placements, and specialty gains on the desk. That amount of
3 revenue formed the “starting point” of determining an individual’s bonus, after which
4 additional factors such as the analysts’ rating in polls were considered. The Director of
5 Technology Research made an initial recommendation regarding the bonus component of a
6 research analyst’s compensation. The final decision was made by three people: Quattrone,
7 and the heads of the Technology Group Mergers and Acquisitions and Corporate Finance
8 departments.

9 The influence of investment banking revenue to the bonus is evidenced in an e-mail
10 from Quattrone to Technology Group officers, including officers in the research department.
11 The subject line of the e-mail included “Please submit your revenue sheets if you want the
12 highest bonus possible.” In the e-mail, Quattrone wrote in part, “Your trusty management
13 team is meeting ... to determine compensation for the group....” The message then urged all
14 the officers to submit a list of the banking deals they participated in so as to ensure a
15 complete list for determining compensation. The emphasis on a research analyst’s
16 contribution to investment banking revenues, along with the influence of Quattrone and other
17 department head in determining compensation, created a conflict of interest for analysts who
18 were charged with the responsibility of preparing and issuing objective research reports.

19 **e. Investment Bankers Evaluated Research Analysts’ Performance, Thereby**
20 **Influencing Their Bonuses and Compromising Research Analysts’ Independence**

21 From July 1998 through 2001, investment bankers who worked with equity research
22 analysts on investment banking deals, in both the Equity and Technology Groups,
23 participated in the analysts’ annual performance evaluations, which in turn affected analysts’
24 bonuses. This input from investment bankers provided a further incentive to equity research
25 analysts to satisfy the needs of investment bankers and their clients, and placed additional
26 pressure on research analyst to compromise their independence.

1 In 2000, CSFB investment bankers used a specific form in order to evaluate equity
2 research analysts, entitled “Evaluation By Banking and Equity Capital Markets
3 Professionals.” On the form, investment bankers reviewed the work of specific research
4 analysts under different categories and provided an overall ranking for the analyst.

5 As an example, in one section called “Business Leadership,” an investment banker
6 wrote of a research analyst: “Coordinates ideas in support of Banking Business; good
7 commercial instinct. Develops and utilizes relationships with client Senior Management,
8 including CEO’s, in pursuing business. Represents firm well.”

9 The conflict between conducting objective research and attracting and retaining
10 investment banking clients was also evidenced in analysts’ self-reviews. For example, one
11 analyst wrote in his self-evaluation: “Trying to manage the research/banking balance.
12 Particularly challenging for me given the amount of banking we do and our dominant
13 banking franchise that has deep roots at CSFB.”

14 **f. CSFB’s Technology Research Analysts Played a Key Role at Investment**
15 **Banking “Pitches” to Help CSFB Win Investment Banking Deals – Including at**
16 **Times the Implicit Promise of Favorable Research**

17 Between July 1998 and 2001, Technology Group research analysts played a key role
18 in helping to win investment banking business for CSFB. Once CSFB’s technology bankers
19 – with the assistance of the technology research analysts – determined that a company was a
20 strong candidate for an offering, a technology research analyst assisted in CSFB’s sales
21 “pitch” to the company, in which CSFB would explain why it should be chosen as the lead
22 managing underwriter for the offering. Quattrone described the relationship between the
23 technology research analysts and investment bankers as follows: “[I]n many of the things
24 that we did with our clients, both groups [Technology Banking and Technology Research]
25 were involved. And the clients experienced CSFB, and in some sense both bankers and
26 analysts worked together in a collaborative fashion to deliver service to a client.”

1 As part of the sales pitch, technology research analysts prepared selling points
2 regarding their research to be included in the pitch books presented to the company. They
3 also routinely appeared with investment bankers at the pitches to help sell CSFB to the
4 potential client. The Director of Research for the Technology Group, described the
5 technology research analyst as the “star of the show” at pitches. CSFB pitch books to
6 potential clients included representations about the role the technology research analyst
7 would play if CSFB obtained the business. The analyst’s written and oral presentations, and
8 the presence of a research analyst at the pitch, strongly implied and at times implicitly
9 promised that CSFB would provide positive research if awarded the investment banking
10 business.

11 For example, in the pitch book for Numerical Technologies, the discussion regarding
12 research coverage headlined “Easy Decision...Strong Buy,” implicitly promising that CSFB
13 would issue a “strong buy” rating upon initiation of coverage. In another example, in a Fall
14 1999 pitch to a different technology company, CSFB’s pitch book stated that the particular
15 CSFB technology research analyst who would cover the company “[g]ets it,” would “pound
16 the table” for the company, and would be the company’s “strongest advocate.” In addition,
17 the pitch book stated that research analyst would engage in “pre-marketing one-on-one
18 meetings [with potential investors] prior to launch.”

19 In describing the “Role of Research,” the pitch book provided a roadmap for the
20 amount and type of coverage that the equity research department would issue in the first year
21 after initiating research, including some research issued at least monthly, and inclusion of the
22 company’s stock as a “focus stock.” The pitch book noted that CSFB’s equity research
23 department would also provide (a) “[s]ignificant ‘front-end’ effort to position the company’s
24 story in a prospectus and at roadshows”; (b) a “[s]ales force ‘teach-in’ to begin
25 communicating the [company’s] opportunity to investors”; (c) “active involvement on
26 roadshow”; (d) “[d]irect follow-up with key investors after one-on-one meetings”; and (e)

1 “standalone” company reports.

2 In another pitchbook, CSFB highlighted that it maintained the highest post-IPO
3 trading volume in a company whose public offering it led while noting that other investment
4 banks did not maintain similar trading volume for their banking clients. At the same time,
5 CSFB highlighted that its research analysts maintained a “strong buy” rating even though the
6 company announced results below estimates. In the pitchbook, CSFB distinguished itself
7 from other deal managers who were shown to have reduced their ratings based upon that
8 financial information. CSFB implied through this pitchbook that the firm would maintain
9 positive research for companies that have entered into investment banking deals with CSFB.

10 **g. Equity Research Analysts Were at Times Pressured by Investment Bankers to**
11 **Initiate or Maintain Positive Research Coverage**

12 CSFB investment bankers, including senior bankers, at times pressured research
13 analysts to initiate or maintain coverage on companies to further ongoing or potential
14 investment banking relationships. Bankers at times applied undue pressure on equity
15 research analysts to initiate research on companies they otherwise would not have covered,
16 maintain ratings they otherwise would have lowered, and maintain coverage of companies
17 they otherwise would have dropped, but for the investment banking relationship.

18 In June 1999, CSFB’s Technology Group investment bankers learned from a
19 corporate official at Gemstar-TV Guide International, Inc. (“Gemstar”) that the company was
20 interested in conducting a secondary offering of its stock. Company officials informed the
21 CSFB investment bankers that publication of research by CSFB was a prerequisite to CSFB
22 being named the investment banker for the planned offering. A Technology Group
23 investment banker informed the company official that CSFB would initiate coverage by July.
24 The investment banker then informed the analyst of the potential investment banking
25 business and noted that it was conditioned on CSFB initiating research for the company.
26 When the research analyst informed the investment banker that other obligations, including

1 administrative responsibilities, would keep him from conducting the necessary research in
2 the time frame mentioned by the banker, Quattrone challenged the research analyst's
3 priorities and directed that he conduct the review of the company on a more aggressive
4 schedule.

5 On June 15, 1999, an investment banker in the Technology Group wrote an e-mail to
6 the research analyst with a copy to Quattrone, stating that one of Gemstar's representatives
7 had:

8 adamantly stated that there will be no [investment banking] transaction
9 without prior research. As you know [another Gemstar representative] has
10 also expressed this same sentiment with regards to working on CSFB. We
11 informed [the Gemstar representative] that you intend to initiate coverage by
12 July, which would facilitate a September offering. ... The main takeaway
13 from the meeting was that there is an opportunity for a very large secondary
14 offering in the second half of this year. We need research for this to happen.

15 Later that day, the research analyst e-mailed the investment banker, with a copy to
16 Quattrone, stating that he could not even look at the matter for almost another three weeks,
17 given his need to study for an examination. In response to that e-mail, Quattrone instructed
18 the research analyst by e-mail to "take a day off from your test prep and go down this week
19 or next." Quattrone then e-mailed the chain of messages to the heads of other Technology
20 Group departments and another individual, noting that Quattrone was "trying to shame" the
21 research analyst into conducting the due diligence and ultimately initiating research coverage
22 of the company without delay.

23 Another example of this kind of conduct relates to Allaire Corp. ("Allaire"), which
24 develops and supports software for a variety of web applications. In January 1999, CSFB
25 acted as the lead manager for Allaire's IPO, earning more than \$3.5 million from the
26 offering. CSFB was also the lead manager of a secondary offering for Allaire in September
1999. The total fees for that offering exceeded \$10 million. On February 19, 1999, CSFB
initiated coverage of Allaire with a "buy" rating. CSFB continued to cover and issue

1 research on Allaire until the research analyst covering the company left CSFB in April 2000.
2 At the time of his departure when the stock was trading at approximately \$130 per share, the
3 research analyst had a buy rating on the company. Another research analyst was tapped to
4 assume coverage of Allaire at that time.

5 The new research analyst's assumption of coverage was delayed and, as of early July
6 2000, the analyst assigned to cover Allaire had issued no new research on the company. In a
7 July 17, 2000 e-mail to Quattrone, the Head of Technology Research, and others, a CSFB
8 investment banker insisted that "[w]e need to do everything in our power to ensure that" the
9 new research analyst "initiates coverage on Allaire." In that e-mail, the investment banker
10 noted, among other things, that CSFB had received favorable fees and splits in connection
11 with its underwriting services for the IPO, the secondary and another transaction and that
12 Allaire's CEO was unhappy with CSFB's research sponsorship of Allaire since late 1999. In
13 a responsive e-mail, Quattrone stated: "We need to make this happen asap." On August 14,
14 2000, a new research analyst assumed coverage of Allaire, maintaining the previous analyst's
15 a buy rating while the stock was trading between \$30 - \$35 per share. A month later, on
16 September 18, 2000, once the stock had dropped below \$10 per share, the research analyst
17 downgraded the stock to a "hold" rating.

18 On one occasion, Quattrone urged certain bankers and research analysts to threaten to
19 drop coverage of a company in an effort to obtain the lead manager position for an
20 investment banking offering. In January 2000, CSFB was attempting to obtain a lead
21 manager position for Aether Systems, Inc. ("Aether"). When Quattrone was informed that
22 Aether had offered CSFB only the co-manager role, and not the bookrunner position for the
23 offering, Quattrone attempted to use his authority by stating in a January 29, 2000 e-mail to
24 investment bankers and research analysts:

25 [N]o ... way do we accept this proposal. [P]lease discuss with me [and
26 others] first thing in the morning. [W]e have agreed on the script, which is
books or walk and drop coverage.

1 **h. CSFB Technology Group’s Practice of Allowing Equity Research Analysts to**
2 **Discuss a Proposed Rating with Company Executives in Advance of Publishing**
3 **the Rating Caused Undue Pressure to Initiate or Maintain Positive Research**
4 **Coverage, and at Times Compromised Equity Research Analyst Independence**

5 CSFB Technology Group allowed its research analysts to provide executives of
6 companies for whom they were about to issue research, with copies of analyses and proposed
7 ratings of their reports for editorial comment prior to dissemination. Technology Group
8 research analysts provided this information, in part, in an attempt to maintain their good
9 standing with the company. This type of direct interaction between analysts and issuers
10 provided additional pressure on the equity research analysts and at times compromised the
11 independence of the research analysts.

12 For example, on October 29, 1999, while preparing to re-initiate coverage for
13 Razorfish, Inc. (“RAZF”), a Technology Group research analyst wrote to the RAZF CEO:

14 With icube about to close, we need to think about resuming coverage of the
15 fish. I want your opinion on rating. We would have taken you to a strong buy
16 but given the recent stock run, does it make sense for us to now keep the
17 upgrade in our back pocket in case we need it? Either way, I don’t care. You
18 guys deserve it, I just don’t want to waste it.

19 The CEO of RAZF responded to the research analyst, stating: “I think we should re-
20 initiate with a buy and a higher price target and keep the upgrade for a little while....
21 Although its [sic] getting hard to justify the valuations.”

22 In this case, the research analyst re-initiated coverage on November 3, 1999 with a
23 strong buy rating when the stock was trading at \$34. He reiterated and maintained that
24 strong buy from January 12, 2000, when the stock was trading at \$39 per share, until October
25 27, 2000, when he finally lowered his rating to a buy rating when the stock was trading at \$4.
26 The research analyst maintained that buy rating until May 4, 2001, when RAZF was trading
at just \$ 1.14. At that time, he once again downgraded to a hold rating.

1 **3. CSFB Issued Fraudulent Equity Research Reports on Two Companies in the**
2 **Technology Sector: Digital Impact and Synopsys. Those Reports Were Unduly**
3 **Influenced by Investment Banking Considerations**

4 The undue, improper influence that investment banking exerted over research
5 analysts caused technology research analysts to issue fraudulent research reports on two
6 companies, Digital Impact and Synopsys. Specifically, investment bankers pressured
7 research analysts to initiate or maintain positive research coverage of these two companies in
8 order to obtain or retain investment banking business. The analysts were pressured or
9 compelled to compromise their own professional opinions regarding companies at the
10 direction of the firm's investment bankers.

11 **a. Digital Impact, Inc.**

12 Digital Impact, Inc. ("DIGI") is a company involved in online direct marketing.
13 CSFB acted as the lead manager for the DIGI IPO in November 1999, earning more than \$5
14 million from the offering. Following the IPO, a CSFB technology research analyst initiated
15 coverage with a "buy" rating. At that time, DIGI traded for just under \$50 per share.
16 Between January 2000 and April 2001, as the stock price declined to less than \$2 per share,
17 CSFB maintained either a "buy" or a "strong buy" rating on the stock.

18 In May 2001, after the original analyst had left CSFB, a senior research analyst in the
19 Technology Group was assigned coverage of DIGI. At that time, DIGI was trading for less
20 than \$2 per share. CSFB assumed coverage and "buy" ratings in June and July 2001.
21 Thereafter, the senior research analyst then met with the company and determined that he
22 wanted to drop coverage of DIGI, noting that DIGI's "market opportunity was just very
23 competitive ... and ... they were going to have ... a difficult time thriving in that
24 environment."

25 The senior research analyst attempted to drop coverage of DIGI on two occasions.
26 On both attempts, the senior research analyst acceded to requests from an investment banker

1 in the Technology Group that he not drop coverage. In a September 4, 2001 e-mail, the
2 senior research analyst informed two investment bankers of his continued desire to drop
3 coverage of DIGI. That day, one of the investment bankers responded:

4 I think [the other investment bankers] will ask for continued cov'g on DIGI
5 given ongoing relationship, good [venture capitalists] and CSFB led IPO.

6 Despite his own desire to drop coverage of the stock, the research analyst acceded to
7 the desires of the investment banker and did not drop coverage on DIGI. The research
8 analyst maintained coverage, and left the "buy" rating unchanged until October 2, 2001,
9 when CSFB downgraded DIGI to a "hold" rating.

10 **b. Synopsys, Inc.**

11 Internal e-mail correspondence among research analysts regarding Synopsys shows
12 that the pressure imposed by investment bankers on research analysts to initiate or maintain
13 favorable coverage was not an isolated problem at CSFB. In May 2001, a technology
14 research analyst wrote an e-mail to the Head of Technology Research, complaining of:

15 Unwritten Rules for Tech Research: Based on the following set of specific
16 situations that have arisen in the past, I have 'learned' to adapt to a set of
17 rules that have been imposed by Tech Group banking so as to keep our
18 corporate clients appeased. I believe that these unwritten rules have clearly
hindered my ability to be an effective analyst in my various coverage sectors.

19 The research analyst wrote that, after downgrading a company in 1998, his investment
20 banking counterpart "informed [him] of unwritten rule number one: that 'if you can't say
21 something positive, don't say anything at all.'" Regarding a second company about which he
22 had reported in 1999, the analyst wrote that he:

23 issued some cautionary comments in the Tech Daily. ... CEO completely lost
24 his composure and swore to the banker, ... that [second company] would
25 never do any business with CSFB (another GS client we were trying to court).
26 At the time, [the investment banker] informed me of unwritten rule number
two: 'why couldn't you just go with the flow of the other analysts, rather than
try to be a contrarian?'

1 The technology research analyst applied these “unwritten rules” to Synopsys, which
2 he had rated as a “strong buy” from July 1999 through June 2000. Specifically, the
3 technology research analyst wrote that he

4 [s]uspected a down-tick in guidance coming and wanted to moderate rating
5 from strong buy to buy. However, banking felt this might impact CSFB’s
6 ability to potentially do business with the company downstream. ... By
7 following rules 1 & 2, I had successfully managed not to annoy the company,
8 or banking.

9 Based on these incidents, the analyst concluded that he was “not naïve enough to lack a sense
10 of appreciation of the role of investment banking (and banking fees) for the franchise.”

11 **4. CSFB Issued Research on Four Companies that Lacked a Reasonable Basis, Made
12 Exaggerated or Unwarranted Claims, was Imbalanced, or Lacked Full and
13 Accurate Disclosures**

14 As to four companies, CSFB’s equity research analysts issued research that lacked a
15 reasonable basis for the claims made, made exaggerated or unwarranted claims, failed to
16 provide a balanced presentation of the relevant facts, and/or failed to disclose important
17 information about the company or CSFB’s and its research analyst’s relationship to the
18 company.

19 **a. Numerical Technologies, Inc.**

20 In April 2000, CSFB acted as lead manager on the IPO of Numerical Technologies
21 for which it received a fee of more than \$5.4 million. Following the IPO, a Technology
22 Group research analyst informed a company official that he planned to initiate coverage with
23 a “buy” rating. The official complained about the proposed rating to an investment banker at
24 CSFB. According to the analyst, the investment banker successfully urged the analyst,
25 “against [the analyst’s] better judgment,” to initiate coverage with a “strong buy” rating.

26 **b. Agilent Technologies, Inc.**

 In certain instances, CSFB equity research analysts maintained positive ratings in
published research reports, while conveying a more negative outlook regarding the stock to

1 their institutional customers within the text of the written research reports. In describing the
2 ratings used from July 1998 through 2001 and beyond, research analysts did not use the same
3 description of the rating as CSFB's published description. According to one senior research
4 analyst:

5 Different analysts have different ways they would interpret a hold rating ...
6 And I think it's probably fair to say that for a number of analysts, particularly
7 because of the fear of backlash that we get from a company ... or ... that we
8 get from institutional investors, there would be a hesitancy to use the "sell"
rating. So analysts did have a tendency to somehow use a hold with more
of a negative slant to it.

9 [T]he monthly review and comment we would verbally describe what we
10 meant by each of the four ratings that I mentioned before. But there was a lot
11 of latitude left to the individual analyst to kind of use the rating I don't want
12 to say in a custom tailored way, but certainly there would be some judgment
applied by the analyst in terms of how they would use this specific rating to
their sector.

13 This approach manifested itself with regard to Agilent Technologies, Inc. CSFB was
14 the co-manager for the November 17, 1999 IPO, earning more than \$5.7 million in fees. A
15 technology research analyst initiated coverage of the company with a "buy" rating on
16 December 13, 1999. On July 21, 2000, the analyst reiterated his "buy" rating, while also
17 describing in his research report that the company had announced that its healthcare business
18 was likely to have an operating loss at least as wide as the previous quarter's loss of \$30
19 million. The report reiterating the "buy" rating also disclosed in the body of the report that
20 the company announced that third quarter earnings would be 18-22 cents per share, compared
21 to the 35 cents average estimate of analysts polled.

22 The report also indicated that:

23 Agilent is rated Buy, only in the most generous sense, though in the short
24 term we would only buy it on extreme weakness, with a 12-24 month time
25 horizon. Our near-term concern is that problems are not typically resolved in
26 one or two quarters.

1 CSFB maintained its “buy” rating until February 2001 when it finally downgraded to
2 “hold.” This came only after Agilent preannounced second quarter revenues and suspended
3 earnings guidance for the remainder of the year, citing a “dramatic slowdown in customer
4 demand.” CSFB’s positive rating of Agilent for an extended period of time despite negative
5 news was cited by a research analyst in CSFB as an example of maintaining a positive rating
6 while signaling negative news to large institutional clients.

7 Following the July 21, 2000 report on Agilent, a CSFB technology research analyst
8 cited the coverage of Agilent to another CSFB research analyst who was facing some “tough
9 decisions” on rating two companies that CSFB had helped take public. The first analyst
10 noted that he wanted to give one of the companies a neutral rating but was “wondering how
11 to approach this based on banking sensitivities.” The other analyst responded suggesting that
12 the analyst “ask [the analyst who covered Agilent for the July 21, 2000 report] about the
13 ‘Agilent Two-Step’. That’s where in writing you have a buy rating (like we do on [the other
14 company], and thank God it’s not a strong buy) but verbally everyone knows your position.”

15 **c. Winstar**

16 Winstar Communications, Inc. (“Winstar”), a provider of broadband
17 telecommunications services, traded on the Nasdaq National Market using the symbol WCII.
18 Winstar competed in the capital-intensive competitive local exchange carrier, (“CLEC”),
19 industry with much larger, established regional Bell operating companies to provide “last-
20 mile” networks to businesses.

21 Winstar never operated at a profit, suffered significant losses, and needed large
22 amounts of capital to survive. As of September 30, 2000, it had more than \$2 billion in
23 accumulated deficits. For the year ended December 31, 2000, Winstar had revenue of \$759.3
24 million, a net loss of \$894.2 million, and (\$9.67) in earnings per share. Net loss to common
25 stockholders totaled more than \$1 billion. On April 5, 2001, Winstar announced a scaled-
26


1 back business plan and the layoff of 2,000 employees - 44 percent of its work force. On
2 April 18, 2001, Winstar filed for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy
3 Code.

4 CSFB, acting through two research analysts in its Equity Research Department, wrote
5 and issued research reports during 2001 that lacked a reasonable basis for its target price and
6 failed adequately to disclose risks of investing in Winstar. Indeed, CSFB's reports during
7 this period did not indicate that investing in Winstar was risky. The firm had initiated equity
8 research coverage of Winstar in May 2000, with a "strong buy" rating and a 12-month target
9 price of \$79. CSFB retained the \$79 target price from January 5, 2001, through April 3,
10 2001, even as the stock plummeted from approximately \$17 to \$0.31 per share and the
11 market capitalization collapsed more than 99%, from \$1.6 billion to \$30 million.

12 The following graph demonstrates how CSFB maintained a "strong buy" rating while
13 Winstar's stock price fell:

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

Winstar's Price and CSFB's Reports



CSFB Lacked a Reasonable Basis for the \$79 Target Price

In three reports between March 1, 2001 and April 5, 2001, when CSFB suspended its rating for Winstar, CSFB's \$79 target price for the company was not reasonable. The target price failed to reflect Winstar's deteriorating stock price, extensive funding needs, likely changes in fundamentals, and over-leveraged balance sheet, as well as the bleak capital markets environment. The target price of \$79 per share represented unreasonably high returns:

- 3/01/01 -- actual price: \$12.5000 % Upside: 632%
- 3/13/01 -- actual price: \$ 7.6875 % Upside: 1028%
- 4/03/01 -- actual price: \$ 0.3125 % Upside: 25,280%

From March 1, 2001 forward, CSFB's target price was more than 50 percent higher than the target price of any other firm covering Winstar.

1 Reports issued in 2001 also failed to disclose that the terms “target price,” “price
2 objective,” or “percentage upside” did not represent the price at which CSFB believed
3 Winstar stock would be trading in 12 months. Instead, CSFB used those terms to reflect the
4 theoretical value of Winstar’s worth in 12 months if a buyer valued Winstar using CSFB’s
5 valuation methodology. CSFB, however, failed to disclose that it was using the terms in this
6 manner.

7 *CSFB Failed Adequately to Disclose Significant Risks of Investing in Winstar*

8 The January 5, 2001, January 8, 2001, and March 1, 2001 reports failed adequately to
9 disclose the risks of investing in Winstar, particularly the risks related to funding, including
10 Winstar’s need to raise more than \$3 billion to fund its business plan to reach a free cash
11 flow positive status and the risk that Winstar might not be able to raise the necessary funds.

12 In a March 13, 2001 research report, CSFB again failed adequately to disclose the
13 risks of investing in Winstar. While disclosing for the first time that Winstar needed to raise
14 more than \$3 billion, the report significantly downplayed the risk that Winstar might not be
15 able to do so:

16 [W]e maintain our forecast that WCII is funded into 1Q02 While we
17 currently forecast that WCII needs over \$3B of additional capital to reach a
18 free cash flow positive status, WCII management effectively laid to rest
19 many of the recent concerns that we have been hearing from investors,
including the quality of WCII’s balance sheet as well as the company’s
funding status.

20 While CSFB research reports identified certain issues relating to funding, those
21 reports did not adequately disclose funding risks or other concerns regarding funding that
22 CSFB equity analysts discussed in internal e-mails. On February 8, 2001, a CSFB equity
23 analyst sent an e-mail with a chart showing Winstar’s cash flows. The e-mail stated:

24 this is FYI ... I worked this up to convince myself that wcii was indeed funded through
25 FY01... I’ve included everything I know about for them over the next year, and it looks like
they have \$185M left at the end of the year.

26

1 Such analysis should have been included in CSFB's disseminated research in order to present
2 a balanced picture of the risks of investing in Winstar.

3 On March 22, 2001, CSFB's senior Winstar equity research analyst e-mailed a
4 customer, who had raised questions about investor concerns and funding in the CLEC sector.
5 The analyst acknowledged in his e-mail that there were funding concerns.

6 On April 5, 2001 when Winstar's price closed at \$0.44, CSFB issued a report
7 suspending its rating. In the report, CSFB explained that the suspension was:

8 following the announcement of a major scale back in the firm's expansion
9 plans but without any positive developments on the much anticipated drive to
10 secure additional sources of funding – both equity and network capacity sales.
11 Given WCII's lack of balance sheet flexibility due to approximately \$360M of
12 cash interest obligations in FY01 (growing to over \$400M in FY02) and the
13 current bleak capital markets environment, we believe that a significant
14 balance sheet restructuring is one of the only situation under which the
15 company can avoid more draconian scenarios.

16 CSFB had not adequately disclosed in earlier reports the concerns mentioned in the April 5,
17 2001 report.

18 **d. NPW**

19 CSFB at times had a proprietary interest in NPW that was not disclosed in research
20 reports issued by the firm. Further, CSFB research analysts covering NPW also had personal
21 proprietary interests in the company but the firm failed to disclose those interests in the
22 published reports. The ownership interests of the firm and the research analysts created a
23 conflict of interest that should have been disclosed.

24 NPW was incorporated in November 1999 as EMW Energy Services Corporation, a
25 division of Enron Energy Services (a division of Enron Corporation ("Enron")). Until
26 January 6, 2000, Enron held all issued and outstanding shares of NPW. NPW's business was
to provide natural gas and electricity to retail customers in newly deregulated state markets
while obtaining the gas and electricity wholesale from Enron. In January and July 2000, DLJ
assisted with two private placements for NPW and received approximately \$1 million in

1 investment banking revenues. DLJ invested \$42.5 million in the two private placements
2 through its affiliated partnerships, known as the "DLJ Merchant Banking Partnerships," in
3 return for approximately 9.7 percent of NPW.

4 On October 5, 2000, NPW conducted an IPO and offered 24 million shares at \$21 per
5 share. DLJ and CSFB were the joint lead underwriters and earned approximately \$15.7
6 million in fees. After the IPO, CSFB, through its acquisition of DLJ, owned 7.9 percent of
7 NPW, while Enron owned 44 percent of the company. In 2000, CSFB and DLJ combined
8 received approximately more than \$12.4 million in investment banking revenues from Enron.
9 In 2001, CSFB received approximately \$21.6 million in investment banking revenues from
10 Enron. From October 2000 to November 2001, CSFB issued 18 "Buy" or "Strong Buy"
11 research reports on NPW. CSFB failed to disclose its proprietary interest in NPW in four of
12 these research reports issued to the public during that period.

13 Also during that period, the senior research analyst covering NPW held undisclosed
14 investments in NPW. The senior analyst invested approximately \$21,000 of his own money,
15 which was leveraged 5:1 by CSFB, in NPW through DLJ partnerships that owned NPW
16 shares. In addition, an associate research analyst who assisted in preparing the reports, and
17 whose name appeared on the reports, held 200 shares of NPW from November 7, 2000, to
18 June 14, 2001. From October 2000 to November 2001, CSFB did not disclose either of the
19 research analysts' financial interests in NPW in the 18 NPW research reports issued to the
20 public.

21 **6. CSFB's Technology PCS Group Engaged In Improper IPO "Spinning" Allocations**
22 **to Corporate Executives of Investment Banking Clients**

23 Quattrone established the Technology PCS (Private Client Services) Group to be part
24 of the Technology Group. The Director of Technology PCS had a primary and direct
25 reporting responsibility to Quattrone with a secondary "dotted-line" reporting responsibility
26 to the Director of CSFB's PCS Department. Technology PCS focused exclusively on the

1 technology sector. Technology PCS operated independently of CSFB's other PCS brokers.
2 The Technology PCS client base consisted, almost exclusively, of officers of investment
3 banking clients of the Technology Group.

4 From approximately March 1999 through April 2001, Technology PCS improperly
5 allocated "hot" IPO stock to executives of investment banking clients and improperly
6 managed the purchase and sale of that stock through discretionary trading accounts. CSFB's
7 Technology Group gave improper preferential treatment to these company executives with
8 the belief and expectation that the executives would steer investment banking business for
9 their companies to CSFB.

10 These executives profited from their allocations of "hot" IPO stock. During this time
11 period, the share value of the technology-related IPOs in which CSFB served as bookrunning
12 manager increased dramatically, with the average share price increase in the immediate
13 aftermarket exceeding 99 percent. In some instances, the aftermarket trading was
14 significantly higher. On December 9, 1999, for example, IPO shares of VA Linux Systems
15 stock, which had a public offering price ("POP") of \$30 per share, closed after the first day
16 of aftermarket trading at \$239.25 per share, representing a 698 percent increase over the
17 offering price. Technology PCS began selling its clients' VA Linux IPO shares on a
18 discretionary basis when the stock was at \$227 per share. Technology PCS allocated 92,000
19 VA Linux IPO shares to 110 discretionary accounts. Within one day of the offering, the
20 Technology PCS brokers sold 41,400 shares (representing approximately 45 percent of the
21 Technology PCS allocation) out of the discretionary accounts, resulting in one-day realized
22 profits of almost \$6.4 million.

23 **a. Discretionary Accounts were Established for "Strategic" Executive Officers of**
24 **Issuers**

25 Pitchbooks used by the Technology Group to win an issuer's investment banking
26 business referenced the discretionary accounts. Consistent with those references and

1 representations made at “pitches,” an issuer had to award CSFB its investment banking
2 mandate before the issuer’s officers were afforded the opportunity to open discretionary
3 accounts and given access to IPO shares by CSFB. Likewise, CSFB considered ways to
4 reduce or eliminate IPO allocations to executives who changed employment and were no
5 longer affiliated with those companies.

6 Once Technology Group received a mandate, Technology PCS established
7 discretionary accounts for executives who were considered to be “strategic.” “Strategic” was
8 commonly understood by Quattrone and Technology PCS managers to refer to the overall
9 business relationship CSFB had with the issuer, including potential future investment
10 banking business. The head of Technology PCS defined “strategic as “senior decision
11 makers” at existing or prospective investment banking clients of the Technology Group who
12 could influence their companies’ choice of investment banker. The accounts were ranked
13 based on the executive’s perceived influence in this regard, and “hot” IPO shares were
14 allocated based on the ranking. Allocations ranged from 1200 shares for accounts ranked
15 one, to 300 shares for accounts ranked 4.

16 Technology PCS did not apply standard CSFB qualification standards (i.e. assets
17 under management, trading revenue production, length of the brokerage relationship, etc.) for
18 the opening of these discretionary accounts. Instead, the decision was based largely on the
19 executive’s position and influence at the company. Technology PCS established a minimum
20 funding level of \$100,000 that was subsequently raised to \$250,000. Technology PCS also
21 set \$250,000 as the maximum level of funds with which customers could fund the
22 discretionary accounts. These discretionary accounts were limited to the purchase and sale of
23 stock purchased through CSFB IPOs. The account holders were not permitted to buy or sell
24 other securities in these accounts, as a result of which Technology PCS turned away millions
25 of dollars of potential customer investments. The number of discretionary accounts serviced
26 by Technology PCS reached a peak in 2000 of approximately 285.

b. Technology PCS Allocated Shares in Every IPO to the Discretionary Accounts and “Flipped” Stock out of the Accounts, Generating Large Trading Profits for the Favored Executives

The Technology PCS Group allocated shares to the discretionary accounts in every IPO in which the Technology Group was involved. Senior Technology Group managers participated in determining allocations to discretionary accounts and deciding for whom such accounts were to be opened. The overwhelming majority of those IPOs were “hot.” Technology PCS personnel decided when and how many IPO shares to sell from the discretionary accounts. In some cases, all the shares allocated to discretionary accounts were sold for a profit on the IPO’s first day of trading in the secondary market. In other cases, half the shares were sold within one or two days of the offering and the remaining half sold sometime later. In virtually all instances, the “flipping” of IPO shares out of the discretionary accounts resulted in the account holders receiving substantial profits with no individual effort and minimal market risk.

The table below provides examples of the extraordinary gains realized in these discretionary accounts and correlates them with the investment banking fees paid to CSFB by the companies with which the accountholders were associated:

Account #	Company	Position	Rank	Life of Acct. (in years)	Total Gain	Internal Rate of Return	IB fees to CSFB
RD1210	Egreetings	CFO	3	1.4	\$585,000	335.98%	\$4,678,000
RD1260	El Sitio	Co-founder	1	1.31	\$1,015,000	950.24%	\$4,911,000
RD1660	Next Level Comm.	CFO	2	1.25	\$710,000	470.45%	\$9,860,000
RD1930	Phone.com	Chairman & CEO	1	1.0	\$1,285,000	268.71%	\$80,720,000
RD2040	iPrint.com	CEO	2	1.15	\$353,000	240.46%	\$1,297,000

c. Unofficial “Performance Reports” were Developed and Distributed by Technology PCS Group Personnel to the Account Holders

Technology PCS prepared unofficial “Performance Reports” measuring the extraordinary performance of these discretionary accounts and furnished the reports to the

1 discretionary account holders. These reports, distributed monthly, showed, among other
2 things, the length of time the account had been open, the amount of contributions to the
3 account, the total gain in the account (before fees) and the account's rate of return. These
4 unofficial reports were meant to ensure that the discretionary account holders were aware of
5 the extraordinary gains being generated for them through the flipping of IPO shares. Some
6 show total gains over the life of the account exceeding \$1 million. One report shows that in
7 little more than a year and a half (September 19, 1999 to June 8, 2001), the account had a rate
8 of return in excess of 3,800%.

9 II.

10 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

11 1. The Commission has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Article XV of the Arizona
12 Constitution and the Securities Act.

13 2. The Commission finds that the above conduct is in violation of A.R.S. §§ 44-1991 and
14 44-1961(A)(13).

15 3. CSFB's conduct is grounds for administrative penalties under A.R.S. § 44-1961(B)(1) and
16 § 44-2036.

17 4. CSFB's conduct is grounds for a cease and desist order pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-
18 1961(B)(2) and § 44-2032.

19 5. CSFB's conduct is grounds for an order requiring CSFB to take affirmative action to
20 correct the conditions and practices giving rise to this action pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-1961(B)(3)
21 and § 44-2032.

22 III.

23 ORDER

24 On the basis of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and CSFB's consent to the entry of this
25 Order, for the sole purpose of settling this matter, prior to a hearing and without admitting or denying
26 any of the Findings of Fact or Conclusions of Law, the Commission finds that the following relief is

1 appropriate, in the public interest, and necessary for the protection of investors.

2 THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

3 1. This Order concludes the investigation by the Commission and any other action that the
4 Commission could commence under applicable Arizona law on behalf of Arizona as it relates to
5 CSFB, relating to certain research or banking practices at CSFB described herein.

6 2. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-1961(B)(2) and (3) and § 44-2032, CSFB will CEASE AND
7 DESIST from violating the Securities Act and will comply with the Securities Act in connection with
8 the research practices referenced in this Order and will comply with the undertakings of Addendum
9 A, incorporated herein by reference.

10 3. Pursuant to A.R.S. § 44-1961(B)(1) and § 44-2036, CSFB shall pay an administrative
11 penalty in the amount of \$1,185,963.00.

12 4. If payment is not made by CSFB or if CSFB defaults in any of its obligations set forth in
13 this Order, the Commission may vacate this Order, at its sole discretion, upon 10 days notice to
14 CSFB and without opportunity for administrative hearing.

15 5. CSFB agrees that it shall not seek or accept, directly or indirectly, reimbursement or
16 indemnification, including but not limited to payment made pursuant to any insurance policy, with
17 regard to all penalty amounts that CSFB shall pay pursuant to this Order or section II of the SEC
18 Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty amounts or any part thereof are added to the
19 Distribution Fund Account referred to in the SEC Final Judgment or otherwise used for the benefit
20 of investors. CSFB further agrees that it shall not claim, assert, or apply for a tax deduction or tax
21 credit with regard to any state, federal or local tax for any penalty amounts that CSFB shall pay
22 pursuant to this Order or section II of the SEC Final Judgment, regardless of whether such penalty
23 amounts or any part thereof are added to the Distribution Fund Account referred to in the SEC
24 Final Judgment or otherwise used for the benefit of investors. CSFB understands and
25 acknowledges that these provisions are not intended to imply that the Commission would agree that
26 any other amounts CSFB shall pay pursuant to the SEC Final Judgment may be reimbursed or

1 indemnified (whether pursuant to an insurance policy or otherwise) under applicable law or may be
2 the basis for any tax deduction or tax credit with regard to any state, federal or local tax.

3 6. This Order is not intended by the Commission to subject any Covered Person to any
4 disqualifications under the laws of any state, the District of Columbia or Puerto Rico (collectively,
5 “State”), including, without limitation, any disqualifications from relying upon the State
6 registration exemptions or State safe harbor provisions. "Covered Person" means CSFB, or any of
7 its officers, directors, affiliates, current or former employees, or other persons that would otherwise
8 be disqualified as a result of the Orders (as defined below).

9 7. The SEC Final Judgment, the NYSE Stipulation and Consent, the NASD Letter of
10 Acceptance, Waiver and Consent, this Order and the order of any other State in related proceedings
11 against CSFB (collectively, the “Orders”) shall not disqualify any Covered Person from any
12 business that they otherwise are qualified, licensed or permitted to perform under the applicable
13 law of Arizona and any disqualifications from relying upon this state’s registration exemptions or
14 safe harbor provisions that arise from the Orders are hereby waived.

15 8. The Orders shall not disqualify any Covered Person from any business that they otherwise
16 are qualified, licensed or permitted to perform under applicable state law.

17 9. For any person or entity not a party to this Order, this Order does not limit or create any
18 private rights or remedies against CSFB including, without limitation, the use of any e-mails or other
19 documents of CSFB or of others regarding research practices, or limit or create liability of CSFB, or
20 limit or create defenses of CSFB to any claims.

21 ...

22 ...

23 ...

24 ...

25 ...

26 ...

1 Nothing herein shall preclude Arizona, its departments, agencies, boards, commissions, authorities,
2 political subdivisions and corporations, other than the Commission and only to the extent set forth
3 in paragraph 1 above, (collectively, "State Entities") and the officers, agents or employees of State
4 Entities from asserting any claims, causes of action, or applications for compensatory, nominal
5 and/or punitive damages, administrative, civil, criminal, or injunctive relief against CSFB in
6 connection with certain research and banking practices at CSFB.

7 BY ORDER OF THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

8
9 /s/ Marc Spitzer

10 CHAIRMAN

William Mundell

COMMISSIONER

Jeffrey Hatch-Miller

COMMISSIONER

11
12 Lowell Gleason

COMMISSIONER

Kristin Mayes

COMMISSIONER

14 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I, BRIAN C. McNEIL,
15 Executive Secretary of the Arizona Corporation
16 Commission, have hereunto set my hand and caused the
17 official seal of the Commission to be affixed at the
18 Capitol, in the City of Phoenix, this 22nd day of
December, 2003.

19 /s/ Brian C. McNeil

BRIAN C. McNEIL

Executive Secretary

21 _____
DISSENT

22 _____
23 DISSENT

24 This document is available in alternative formats by contacting Yvonne McFarlin, Executive
25 Assistant to the Executive Secretary, voice phone number 602-542-3931, E-mail
ymcfarlin@cc.state.az.us.

26 (PAH)

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

CONSENT TO ENTRY OF ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER BY CSFB

CSFB hereby acknowledges that it has been served with a copy of this Administrative Order, has read the foregoing Order, is aware of its right to a hearing and appeal in this matter, and has waived the same.

CSFB admits the jurisdiction of the Commission, neither admits nor denies the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law contained in this Order; and consents to entry of this Order by the Commission as settlement of the issues contained in this Order.

CSFB states that no promise of any kind or nature whatsoever was made to it to induce it to enter into this Order and that it has entered into this Order voluntarily.

Gary G. Lynch represents that he/she is Vice Chairman of CSFB and that, as such, has been authorized by CSFB to enter into this Order for and on behalf of CSFB.

Dated this 4th day of September, 2003.

Credit Suisse First Boston LLC

By: /s/ Gary G. Lynch

Title: Vice Chairman

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 4th day of September, 2003.

/s/ Caroline R. Marquardt
Notary Public

My Commission expires:

10/28/06